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Ideology and Experimentation in 
China’s Economic Rise:




 China’s economic transformation from an agrarian, 
undeveloped country to an advanced, industrialized nation under 
an authoritarian political system has challenged some of the core 
tenets espoused by new institutional economics, specifically 
raising questions about the necessity of certain institutional 
conditions for economic development. Economist Dani Rodrik 
has challenged the idea that there are definitive institutional 
prerequisites and universal best practices for economic growth, 
arguing instead that successful institutional arrangements and 
effective economic policies are country-specific and depend on 
translating local experience into national policy making. Rodrik’s 
insight can serve as an important starting point in understanding 
China’s rise to dominance in the global economic arena given 
that this process occurred under unorthodox institutional 
arrangements. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to understand how 
a state with a rigid bureaucracy was able to undergo such a striking 
economic transformation. This feat is especially surprising 
considering that the Chinese politicians who propelled the reform 
effort faced forceful political opposition throughout the entirety 
of the reform process, first attacked by ideologues who resisted 
change altogether and later by more conservative politicians 
who recognized the need for reform but sought to limit its scope. 
 In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that this ideological 
controversy not only played a key role in China’s economic 
development but also served as a constructive force throughout 
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the process of reform. Specifically, I argue that ideological 
opposition to economic reform, instead of functioning as 
an obstacle to China’s economic growth, contributed to its 
success by forcing Chinese reformers to adopt an effective 
experimental and incremental approach to transforming the 
economy that was in part facilitated by the authoritarian 
environment. Although the opposition to reform was not 
limited to the realm of the Communist Party of China (CPC), I 
mostly focus on this dynamic within the CPC because reform 
programs were initiated and regulated by Party members. In the 
first section, I outline the role of ideology in the reform process. 
In the second section, I explain how ideological opposition 
to reform contributed to the experimental and gradual nature 
of reform and use the policy of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) as a case study, illustrating how ideological constraints 
played a key role in the ultimate success of this innovative 
initiative. In the final section, I discuss how the presence of 
special institutional prerequisites in China was conducive 
to the efficacy of the experimental approach to reform.
Ideology in China’s Economic Transformation
 Before engaging in an analysis of the role ideology 
played in China’s economic transformation, the concept of 
ideology must be defined. Wei-wei Zhang, a Chinese historian, 
defines ideology as “a set of ideas with a discursive framework 
which guides and/or justifies policies and actions, derived from 
certain values and doctrinal assumptions about the nature and 
dynamics of history.”1 In line with this definition, ideology can 
essentially be understood as referring to the values and ideas 
that constitute theoretical justifications for policy. Ideology 
is important for understanding the reforms that underlay 
China’s economic growth because China’s political system is 
by nature ideological; all policy ideas require an ideological 
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justification. Chinese bureaucrats generally view ideology 
not only as a personal commitment but also as a statement of 
what they envision to be the correct course of action for China. 
As such, the convention in the CPC offers an opportunity for 
leaders to situate their ideas in a viable theoretical framework 
in order to achieve a consensus for a given policy agenda.2 
 Given the ideology-oriented nature of Chinese politics, 
it is unsurprising that the beginning of the reform process was 
characterized by an ideological debate between post-Mao 
reformers, who sought to shift the focus of Chinese politics 
away from class struggle and towards economic development, 
and the Cultural Revolution Left, who remained loyal to 
the core tenets of Mao’s communist doctrine, a variant of 
Marxism-Leninism that focused on the peasantry as the main 
revolutionary force.3 Many Party members aligned themselves 
with Maoism despite the fact that some of Mao’s programs 
had resulted in disastrous economic consequences, specifically 
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. 
Hua Guofeng, Mao’s successor, deliberately prioritized 
elements in Maoism that would permit economic development 
and contact with other countries but fundamentally remained 
within the framework of Mao’s model for China. He emphasized 
continuity over change and advocated for the modernization 
of China without altering its existing economic structure.4
 In contrast, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese 
politician who would spearhead China’s 
economic reforms and served as the paramount political 
leader of China from 1978-1992, believed that the economic 
stagnation during the years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) had demonstrated that change was necessary. 
In Deng’s view, although this crisis had diminished Mao’s 
doctrine and the legitimacy of the CPC in the realm of 
public opinion, it also harbored the potential to serve 
as a positive catalyst for some much-needed change.5
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 Deng’s immediate obstacle was the pervasive influence 
of Maoism among Party members. He was tasked with breaking 
this “monolithic attitude” by encouraging CPC members to 
reevaluate their understanding of Mao’s policies and China’s 
economic past.6 Deng criticized Hua for “upholding whatever 
policy decisions Chairman Mao instructed” and argued for 
introducing an element of critical thinking into policymaking.7 
According to Deng, in order to regain the trust of the 
people, the Party needed to move away from Mao’s radical 
ideology, shift the emphasis from politics and revolution 
to the economy and modernization, and initiate successful 
market reforms that would provide the general population 
with discernible benefits. However, before initiating a reform 
program, Deng needed to devise and present a comprehensive 
ideological justification for this course of action. Only 
with ideological backing could he win the leadership 
struggle against Hua and galvanize support from the Party 
members, many of whom still believed in Mao’s core tenets.8
 Deng introduced several aspects of his ideology at the 
Third Plenum, a pivotal meeting of the Central Committee of 
the CPC that took place in 1978, two years after Mao’s death.9 
Although he adroitly avoided blaming Mao directly, Deng 
criticized the rigid thinking of the members of the CPC during 
Mao’s leadership. He encouraged Party members to “dare to 
think, explore new ways and generate new ideas” going forward, 
arguing that “otherwise, we won’t be able to rid our country of 
poverty and backwardness.”10 He established a reform-oriented 
policy agenda that prioritized modernization and emphasized 
decentralization, insisting that reforming the central planning 
system held the potential to increase productivity. Deng stressed 
economic development as the primary goal of the Party; 
this prioritization of the economy would become a defining 
characteristic of his leadership. A few years later, in a talk with 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom in 
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1984, Deng argued that the merit of an ideology and policy 
should be judged only by one criterion; namely, whether they 
promote economic development.11 This statement points to a 
fundamental difference between Mao’s and Deng’s approaches 
to advancing China’s economy; while Mao prioritized political 
and social ideology, Deng prioritized economic performance. 12
 Another defining feature of Deng’s ideology 
was his determination for China to chart its own path of 
economic growth rather than importing policy recipes 
from abroad. Deng expressed this idea in 1982 at the 
Twelfth National Congress of the CPC, stating that:13
Deng famously characterized his strategy of economic 
modernization as “crossing the river by feeling the stones,”14 
which encapsulates his belief in an experimental, gradual, and 
pragmatic approach to reform.15 Deng’s developmental theme 
of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” provided a flexible 
framework for him to initiate and justify economic experiments 
that would allow him to realize his goal of exploring a unique 
path of reform and modernization. This concept reflected his 
commitment to modernizing China without Westernizing it, 
a position which was partly informed by his experience with 
the West. Deng viewed power dynamics with the Western 
world as unfavorable to less developed countries like China 
and approached engagement with the West with tremendous 
skepticism. In 1982, during the early period of the reform 
process, he remarked that “there are still some people around 
who are wedded to the ideas of the old-line colonialists; they 
are reluctant to see the poor countries develop and attempt 
to throttle them.”16 This theme was also derived in part from 
In carrying out our modernization program we must 
proceed from Chinese realities… mechanical application 
of foreign experience and copying of foreign models will 
get us nowhere…We must integrate the universal truth of 
Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of 
our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics.
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Deng’s socialist critique of Western values. Although Deng 
in many ways sought to distance himself from Mao and 
his theories, he still situated his reforms in the context of a 
socialist discourse, believing in many of the core values of 
socialism. Deng’s commitment to embarking on a unique 
path of Chinese growth played a critical role in the success 
of the reform process. Although he encouraged gleaning 
insight from studying the experiences of foreign countries, 
he understood that China would have to walk its own, 
distinctive path to economic development and modernization.
 Indeed, given the divergent pre existing institutional 
arrangements in China and in the West, the policies that Western 
economists would have recommended for China based on 
Washington consensus initiatives would have been unlikely to 
stimulate economic growth. For example, conventional advice 
for a country working towards opening its economy includes 
reducing restrictions on imports, decreasing import tariffs, and 
enabling the conversion of the currency for trade transactions. 
However, had the Chinese leadership followed this standard 
list of recommendations, the removal of barriers to trade 
would have resulted in the closure of many state enterprises 
without encouraging new investments in industry, crippling 
employment and economic growth. Instead, Chinese politicians 
explored innovative solutions that did not exert excessive 
pressure on the existing industrial infrastructure.17 Thus, this 
determination to discover innovative economic solutions 
contributed to the ultimate success of the reform process.  
Through his developmental theme of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics,” Deng was able to galvanize enough support 
to get the first of his reform initiatives off the ground.18 These 
early reforms mainly consisted of rural reforms that aimed to 
decentralize certain features of the planning system and were 
largely modelled on the local initiatives in Sichuan in the 
1970s, which laid the foundation for many future top-down 
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programs.19 The Sichuan reforms had been spearheaded by 
Zhao Ziyang, then the local Party secretary.20 However, Deng’s 
early success did not mark the end of the ideological struggle 
that confronted him and other reformers. As they continued to 
push for reform, a divide emerged between more conservative 
reformers—which ironically refers to those on the ultraleft, 
namely, those who adhered more closely to Maoist doctrine—
and more radical reformers, who advocated for more rapid and 
extensive economic restructuring.21 Both camps fundamentally 
agreed about opening up China’s economy and changing some 
aspects of the central planning system, but disagreed about 
the nature, pace, and scope of the change.22 Reform initiatives 
were often attacked and sometimes tempered or blocked by 
the more conservative members of the CPC. Although this 
dynamic recurred throughout the reform process, I will focus 
on one example in order to illustrate the nature of this pattern. 
 In early 1983, following the success of rural reforms 
in improving productivity and increasing agricultural output, 
Deng and other reformers took steps to expand these reforms 
to urban areas. Specifically, in Chongqing, a city with a 
population in the low millions, reformers initiated changes 
with the goal of decentralizing certain aspects of the central 
planning system. Planning was allowed to be carried out under 
national as opposed to provincial control, individual sectors 
were expanded, housing was commercialized, and enterprises 
were granted more agency in decision-making.23 Similar 
changes were adopted in other large cities, such as Wuhan. 
However, these developments were met with ideological 
opposition from the conservative camp. The Chinese 
newspaper Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily) responded with 
an article entitled “It is Necessary to Adhere to the Planned 
Economy”, arguing that reform should adhere to socialist 
values and not “weaken the planned economy.”24 Although 
this opposition failed to impact reforms on the grassroots 
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level, it prevented Deng from gaining a leadership consensus 
that would have allowed him to institute more radical forms.25 
 This pattern of reform followed by ideological attack 
that served to restrain the implementation of further changes 
recurred throughout the years of Deng’s leadership. Because 
of this, Wei-Wei Zhang argues that the course of political and 
ideological change from 1978-1993 should be divided into 
four main periods that can be classified as cycles because 
each stage was marked by a period of advance, consisting of 
reformist values and initiatives, followed by one of retreat, 
involving ideological criticism of the reforms and consequent 
readjustment.26 This dynamic affected the nature of reform 
in two ways. Along with other factors, it forced many of the 
reforms to take the shape of small-scale pilot experiments from 
the outset because ideological constraints would have prevented 
the implementation of the reforms on a national scale, and it 
also served to temper the pace of reform once reforms were 
implemented, forcing the process to progress incrementally, 
gradually, and deliberately, often prompting the reevaluation 
and revision of reform programs.27 The trial-oriented and 
gradual nature of the reform process, as will be outlined in more 
detail, played a major role in the ultimate success of many of the 
reform initiatives and thereby in China’s overall economic rise.
The Experimental and Incremental Nature of China’s 
Economic Reforms
 Before analyzing the experimental character of China’s 
economic reforms, it is important to note that ideological 
controversy was not the only factor that caused the process to 
operate in an experimental and incremental manner. Arguably, 
the primary challenge for the reformers was to figure out how 
to shift a system whose characteristics and mechanisms had 
become ingrained over a twenty-year period.28 They had to 
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find innovative solutions to reshape market structures and 
open up China’s economy while working with the preexisting 
institutional and economic arrangements that were structured 
around the central planning system and virtual economic 
isolation from the rest of the world.29 Nonetheless, ideological 
opposition also served as an important restraining force on 
the process of reform, and without this factor, even given 
the institutional obstacles, the reform process likely would 
have occurred faster and on a larger scale. If the reformers 
had never struggled to gain consensus on their initiatives, 
the reform process would most likely not have been as 
experiment-based or as gradual. Thus, by limiting the scale 
and pace of reform, ideological controversy contributed to the 
experimental and incremental nature of these developments.
 Although Deng and other reformers wanted to adopt 
many of their reforms on a larger scale, they were forced to 
initiate many of their projects via small-scale pilot experiments 
due to ideological constraints.30 Of course, many of the 
initiatives also took this form simply because the reformers 
did not know which policies would succeed, but again, these 
reforms likely would have been adopted on a larger scale 
without the ideological opposition of more conservative 
members of the Party. The ideological constraints on reform 
were a significant determinant of the experimental nature of 
these reforms, and the fact that these reforms were confined 
to small scale experiments was tremendously fortuitous; it 
prevented the reformers from adopting rash policies on the 
national level. Instead, the experimental initiatives functioned 
to allow the reformers to see which policies fostered favorable 
economic outcomes and which hampered growth under 
local conditions, ultimately allowing for the “selective 
integration of local experiences into national policymaking.”31
 For much of China’s economic transformation, 
experimental initiatives were the dominant mode of economic 
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reform. In the early to mid 1980s, approximately half of all the 
national regulations in China had explicitly experimental status. 
32As Rodrik explains, “through experimentation, China’s policy 
makers sought to discover solutions that would overcome 
their constraints and be more suited to local conditions.”33 A 
significant part of the success of the experimental policies was 
that after each period of advance in the reform process, Party 
members had to evaluate and readjust certain elements of every 
program before surging ahead with new initiatives.34 Although 
in the short term this dynamic may appear to have restricted 
the pace of reform, and perhaps in individual cases, did indeed 
have this effect, this paradigm had a valuable impact on the 
long term process of economic growth. The pattern of advance, 
ideological attack, and consequent revision ensured that future 
reforms were thoroughly thought out and directly based 
on the outcomes of the experiments under local conditions.
 The establishment of the Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) illustrates this process of experimentation, ideological 
critique, and readjustment and is broadly representative of how 
this sequence manifested in many of China’s other reforms. As 
an experiment for opening up China’s economy to the outside 
world, certain regions within China were granted more flexible 
policies in foreign trade in order to attract foreign technology 
and investment.35 The approach of limiting the process of 
opening up to small-scale experimentation proved to be very 
effective. If reformers had jumped to open up larger areas 
faster by eliminating barriers to trade, this likely would have 
caused state owned enterprises to close without substantially 
stimulating new investments in industrial activities, increasing 
unemployment, and impeding economic growth.36 Deng was 
very attuned to the experimental nature of this initiative and 
the potential advantages of implementing this type of pilot 
policy. In the summer of 1985, Deng disclosed to a visiting 
Algerian delegation the following remarks regarding the 
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Shenzhen SEZ that had been established five years earlier37:
Unsurprisingly, the experiment of the SEZs was met with 
sharp ideological critique. The Chinese media invoked 
egalitarian values to criticize the increasing inequality of 
income between the SEZs, coastal areas, and poorer inner 
regions and pointed to the reemergence of exploitation in 
private enterprises. Advocates of central planning within the 
CPC argued that the special privileges conferred to foreign 
investors as a part of this policy constituted a concession to 
Western powers. In late 1985, students joined this crusade 
and protested in Beijing, specifically claiming that China’s 
open-door policy involved excessive concessions to Japan.38 
This mounting opposition to the SEZs escalated to the point 
that Party members, fearful of this rising trend and the threat 
it posed to their authority, decided to reevaluate this policy.
 In the process of revisiting the SEZs, the reformers 
found that the performance of the SEZs was not as successful 
as expected up to this point. Increasing economic costs, the 
lack of high-tech industries, foreign exchange imbalances, and 
disproportionate infrastructure spending demonstrated that 
the SEZs had not achieved their original goals of attracting 
foreign technology and facilitating a successful export-
oriented strategy.39 Though due to these outcomes it is likely 
that reformers would have reevaluated the SEZ policies 
on their own volition, ideological attacks—specifically, 
widespread protest with underlying ideological justification—
were the immediate impetus to this reconsideration. Because 
of the opposition to this policy, “reformers were under 
strong pressure to explore other policy alternatives for SEZ 
development that could produce fast and visible results.”40
The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an experiment. It will 
be some time before we  know whether we are doing the right 
thing there. It is something new under socialism. We hope to 
make it a success, but if it fails, we can learn from the experience.
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 The reformers realized that their original strategy for 
the SEZs was too ambitious and radical to succeed. By late 
1985, they formulated a new and more realistic strategy based 
on the results of the experiment of the SEZs up to that point. 
They revised their targets to focus on pragmatic, short-term 
objectives rather than a vision of a distant endpoint. For example, 
they adopted the realistic goal of advancing small and medium 
enterprises that would promote better-quality manufacturing 
and light industry.41 They also implemented a “two way” strategy 
in which zones would use foreign investment and technology 
to develop an industrial capacity that would allow them to 
compete in the international export market.42 The domestic 
market would also be used to develop an export-oriented 
economy, and the home market would be selectively opened 
to zone-based foreign enterprises if they utilized advanced 
technology. As a result, the SEZs would function in a reciprocal 
manner, not only leading to China’s participation in the world 
market but also bringing world market forces into China.43
 By the middle of 1987, this revised strategy had yielded 
positive results. The SEZs had become export-oriented, and 
foreign investment had multiplied. In June, Deng declared the 
ultimate success of the SEZs and stated this explicitly in a talk 
with a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia44:
The improvement of the SEZs as a result of this process 
highlights the critical role of ideological opposition in 
modulating reform. Ideological critique functioned as the 
immediate catalyst that propelled the reformers to refine and 
revise the less effective aspects of the SEZ strategy, ultimately 
leading to marked improvement in the outcomes of this policy. 
From the outset, ideological constraints proved helpful in 
The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone is an experiment. It will 
be some time before we  know whether we are doing the right 
thing there. It is something new under socialism. We hope to 
make it a success, but if it fails, we can learn from the experience.
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limiting the implementation of SEZs by restricting the scope 
of reform. By confining this experiment to a smaller scale, 
ideological controversy, among other factors, allowed this 
policy to be implemented and later revised without engendering 
the widespread economic setbacks that likely would have 
transpired had China opened up their economy on a national 
level.  Although the example of the SEZ is perhaps particularly 
clear-cut in exhibiting this dynamic, this trend is evident in many 
of the other reforms that stimulated China’s economic growth.45
The Context of the Experimental Approach: China’s 
Institutions
 The efficacy of the experimental approach to reform 
in China was likely in part due the presence of certain 
pre-existing institutional prerequisites. Specifically, the 
authoritarian political system dominated by the CPC involves 
certain features that are conducive to policy experimentation. 
The Party’s unitary organization and unified commitment 
to economic modernization, the lack of vulnerability of 
Party members to electoral cycles, and the fact that China’s 
economy was growing but relatively less advanced fostered an 
environment in which policymakers were willing to take some 
risks via experimental reforms.46 These conditions created 
a unique set of circumstances in which Party policymakers, 
secure in their own power, were willing to take political risks 
in launching experimental reforms with the hope of boosting 
China’s economy. This experimental and incremental approach 
to reform likely would not have been as successful in a more 
advanced political economy under more democratic conditions. 
Sebastian Heilman, a political scientist who specializes in 
China, explains that in an advanced political economy “most 
policymakers, administrators, interest groups and citizens…
tend to view experimental policy departures as risky, 
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destabilizing, and threatening to their stakes in the status quo.”47
 Although the political system of an authoritarian 
government allows for policy experimentation, which may 
in turn stimulate economic growth, it is also important 
to recognize that experimentation within the context of a 
rigid bureaucratic government is limited in its capacity to 
provide people with social and public goods. Implementing 
policies that grant access to health care, protection of 
land tenure rights, and environmental protection involves 
imposing national policy priorities in response to societal 
advocacy that would oppose the short-term interests of 
most local elites.48 Thus, while China’s economic reforms 
were successful in invigorating the economy, they were 
accompanied by a host of social problems and needs, many 
of which were not alleviated until years later or not at all.49
 Similarly, although many theories point to 
economic growth as a precursor to political liberalization, 
democratization did not immediately follow China’s economic 
development, perhaps illustrated most poignantly by the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989.50 The lack of democracy 
is a fundamental part of this story, and in fact, this arrangement 
made the role of ideological opposition all the more critical. 
According to Zhang, ideological controversy takes on 
additional significance in “the absence of institutionalized 
democracy because it generates pressure on reformers to 
act with prudence for tangible results, and it guards against 
any simplistic approach to China’s complicated economic 
problems.”51 Not only did ideological critique contribute 
to the success of reforms by forcing them to be exploratory 
and gradual but it also served as a kind of quasi-democratic 
check on China’s authoritarian political system, functioning 
as a channel in which public demands wielded some degree of 
influence over the political considerations of Party members. 
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Conclusion
 Ideological opposition played a central role in the 
process of reforming China’s economy, serving as a restraining 
force that shaped the experimental and gradual character of 
the reforms. By limiting new initiatives to small-scale pilot 
programs, this dynamic allowed Chinese policymakers to see 
what worked on the local level before they adopted policies 
on the national scale. Furthermore, ideological critique 
encouraged the reexamination and consequent improvement 
of reform programs, as exhibited by the example of the SEZs. 
The experimental approach to reform was in part enabled by 
China’s existing institutional arrangements, as the authoritarian 
political system contributed to Chinese leaders’ affinity for 
a trial-based strategy. The unconventional story of China’s 
economic rise thus supports the idea that a successful path to 
economic development depends on pre-existing institutional 
arrangements. A given institutional framework in one place 
may facilitate a certain approach to economic growth, and 
policy experimentation, in environments in which it is 
possible, bears the potential to demonstrate which programs 
yield positive outcomes under local conditions. China’s 
economic growth highlights the potential benefits of charting 
a unique path to growth instead of attempting to replicate the 
experiences of other countries, serving to underscore that 
there is no universal formula for economic development.
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